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Abstract
The first professional base ball clubs came in two varieties: stock clubs, which
paid their players fixed wages, and player cooperatives, in which players shared
the proceeds after expenses. We argue that stock clubs were formed with players of known ability, while co-ops were formed with players of unknown ability.
Although residual claimancy served to screen out players of inferior ability in coops, the process was imperfect due to the team production problem. Based on
this argument, we suggest that co-ops functioned as an early minor league system
where untried players could seek to prove themselves and eventually move up to
wage teams. Empirical analysis of data on player performance and experience in
early professional base ball provides support for the theory.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: L14, L23

The Old Ball Game:
Organization of Nineteenth Century Professional Base Ball Clubs1
INTRODUCTION
Most baseball fans with even a casual interest in the history of the sport know that
the first openly professional team was the Cincinnati Red Stockings in 1869.2 What far
fewer know is that the first professional baseball league, called the National Association
of Professional Base Ball Players (or National Association for short), formed in 1871 and
lasted through the 1875 season, after which it folded due to financial and other
difficulties.3 A year later, the present-day National League arose out of the National
Association’s ashes.
Baseball is unique among professional sports in the reverence that it holds for its
history, yet the National Association has received relatively little attention from most
baseball historians (Ryczek, 1999: p. xi). And economists, who in recent decades have
extensively studied the business of professional baseball,4 have neglected it altogether.
This is unfortunate, because much can be learned from the sort of experimentation that
ordinarily characterizes new ventures. Such experimentation occurred in the new league,
both on the field in terms of playing techniques and rules, but also in organizational
forms. The latter issue is the subject of the current paper. The analysis employs modern
economic theories of organization with historical evidence on team and player
performance to develop a theory of team production and organization in early
professional base ball.
The specific question we examine is why some teams in the National Association
paid their players fixed salaries while others were organized as cooperatives with players

1

sharing in the gate receipts after expenses. From an economic perspective, one might
suppose that cooperative clubs, by making players the residual claimants, should have
provided greater incentives for effort and/or attracted players of higher ability (Lazear,
1986, 2000). In fact, this does not appear to have been the case; as Table 1 shows, at the
close of the 1872 season, the cooperative clubs were at the bottom of the league standings
(their performance in other years was similar—see Ryczek (1999)).
To explain this seemingly anomalous result, we argue that fixed wage clubs (also
known as stock clubs) were comprised largely of players known to have high ability
based on their earlier performance for amateur and semi-pro clubs, while cooperatives
were formed primarily with players of unknown ability. In this sense, we argue that
cooperatives did represent a response to uncertainty in the market for players, once the
players of known ability were all taken. We further argue, however, that the ability of coops to screen players was imperfect due to the inherent team production problem
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), which explains the inferior performance of cooperatives
relative to fixed wage clubs. Nevertheless, we suggest that cooperatives served an
important screening function in early professional baseball by acting as a sort of nascent
minor league for untried players. Thus, many players who began on co-ops eventually
moved on to stock teams and became stars, while others had short-lived professional
careers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the
theoretical framework, and the following section presents some empirical evidence in
support of the theory using data on player performance and experience. The final section
summarizes our conclusions.
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THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
As noted, teams in the National Association were of two types: stock (wage) clubs
and cooperative clubs (or co-ops). The stock clubs raised capital through the issuance of
common stock and the contributions of club members. This capital plus revenue from
gate receipts were used to cover operating expenses, including player salaries (Ryczek,
1999: p. 35). Stock owners were therefore the residual claimants to any profits left over
after expenses and salaries were paid. The co-op clubs, in contrast, relied entirely on gate
receipts, and rather than a salary, players received a share of the receipts after expenses
were paid (Rader, 1992: pp. 30-31). Under this arrangement, the players (workers) were
the residual claimants. In what follows, we draw insights from the economics of
organization literature to suggest an explanation for the co-existence of stock and co-op
clubs in early professional base ball.
Risk-sharing?
We begin with risk-sharing. In his classic analysis of agricultural contracts,
Cheung (1969) argued that an important explanation for the prevalence of sharecropping
contracts in agriculture is that they share the risks of uncertain output between the
landlord and the tenant. This assumes that both parties are risk averse and therefore value
some protection against output variation.5 By this logic, fixed wage contracts would be
preferred if the landlord is the superior risk bearer, while fixed rental contracts would be
preferred if the tenant can better bear the risk.
If risk aversion similarly explains the different contracts in baseball, we would
have to conclude that players on stock teams were more risk-averse than those on co-op
teams. This may or may not be true, but it would be difficult to test absent evidence about
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individual players’ risk preferences. Further, the evidence we do have is that stock teams
performed better on the field, and there is no reason to suppose that better players were
systematically more risk averse. We therefore seek an alternative explanation (based on
imperfect information) from which we can derive testable predictions.6
The Team Production Problem
For purposes of our analysis, we assume that the owners (residual claimants) of a
professional base ball club were interested in maximizing profits. The revenues consisted
of gate receipts, and the costs were capital costs (e.g., building an enclosed park),
operating expenses, and, in the case of stock clubs, player salaries.
An important determinant of revenue was the performance of the team, which
depended largely on the abilities of the players. However, because sports teams represent
a prototypical example of “team production,” the contributions (abilities) of individual
members of the team may be difficult to discern simply by observing the output
(performance) of the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). As a result, the team faced the
standard problem associated with team production: how to monitor the workers so that
compensation would correspond as closely as possible to individual contributions to
output (the metering problem).7 At this point, we should note that our discussion of team
production will differ slightly from that in Alchian and Demsetz in that we will focus
primarily on unobservable player “abilities” rather than “efforts.” For purposes of the
current discussion, this distinction is unimportant since much of what we will say in this
section applies equally to effort and ability. However, the focus on ability paves the way
for the analysis of ability differences across players in the next section.
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In the context of ability differences, the metering problem amounts to paying
workers according to their individual marginal products as well as screening out inferior
workers. Alchian and Demsetz argue that the capitalist firm solves this problem by
appointing a specialized monitor who becomes the residual claimant after the inputs have
been paid. As the sole residual claimant, the monitor’s incentive to shirk in that role is
minimized. In contrast, Alchian and Demsetz argue that in a profit-sharing (or
cooperative) firm that relies on mutual or self-monitoring, each member will have a
greater incentive to shirk because the losses resulting from any one member’s failure to
work hard will be partially passed on to the other members. As a result, mutual
monitoring with profit sharing should be inferior to centralized monitoring by a residual
claimant.
The Alchian-Demsetz story emphasizes the importance of residual claimancy to
maximize the incentive to monitor, but Putterman (1984) notes that the technology of
monitoring is also important. For some kinds of tasks, he argues, it may be that mutual,
or peer-monitoring is at least as effective as centralized monitoring by a single individual.
For example, Putterman (1984: p. 173-174) observes that
Some activities allow individuals to work and to observe one another’s
performance simultaneously, … so that output and monitoring are joint products.
While … monitoring is made difficult by technologically nonseparable activities,
the implication that a third party can better assess the effort level of team
members cannot be asserted to hold universally…
Early baseball may have been an activity for which third party monitoring was not
effective. In its infancy, the ballplayers themselves were likely the best judges of talent.
Most teams did not have specialized managers but rather had the modern-day equivalent
of “player-managers” (Burk, 1994, p. 43). Further, players were more versatile, often
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playing multiple positions,8 which would have enhanced their ability to evaluate one
another’s performance and ability (Cosgel and Miceli, 1999). In the early years, even
umpires were generally drawn from the ranks of players (Ryczek, 1999: p. 103). For
these reasons, the problem of team production in base ball (whether dependent on
abilities or efforts) may not have automatically favored a single-monitor/ residual
claimancy type of organization over a mutual-monitoring/ profit-sharing arrangement.9
While the team production/monitoring story provides a partial explanation for the
co-existence of stock clubs and co-ops, it does not explain certain stylized facts; in
particular, the marked inferiority of co-op clubs on the field compared to stock clubs. If
co-ops were at least as good at solving the team production problem in terms of
motivating players and weeding out those of inferior ability, then why didn’t they
perform as well on the field? We seek to answer this and related questions in the next
section.
Contracting Between Players and Owners
In this section, we consider the impact of uncertainty on the part of owners about
players’ abilities. According to Ryczek (1999: p. 35), when professional teams began to
form, the stock entries in the National Association filled their rosters first with the best
players, leaving the co-op entries to “pick up the pieces.” This suggests that there in fact
existed a group of players in the pool whose abilities were known to prospective owners
as a result of their past performance on amateur or semi-pro teams.10 Clearly, the owners
would have selected the best players from this group, and because there was no
uncertainty about their abilities, these owners would have been willing to offer them
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wages consistent with their abilities. In this case, the market for players functioned
efficiently.
Players known to be of high ability were in short supply, however, so once they
were all signed, if further profits could be earned, new teams would have had to draw
from among players of unknown ability. In the early days of base ball, scouting of
untried players was virtually unknown due to the difficulty of travel and communication
(Burk, 1994, p. 44). Players often simply wrote to an owner requesting a position on the
team. Faced with this sort of uncertainty about the ability of an unknown player, a
rational owner would only have been willing to offer a wage based on the average ability
in the pool of potential players. Under this arrangement, above-average players would
either have been underpaid, or would have chosen not to play at all, depending on their
next best option.11 In response to this adverse selection problem, good players may have
found it advantageous to form “player-owned,” or cooperative, teams where they would
share in the profits after expenses. Such an arrangement would have allowed them to
capture the full returns on their abilities after paying expenses.
The situation is analogous to Barzel’s description of the problem facing
immigrant workers in agriculture:
Landowners are reluctant to commit themselves to paying new workers the
prevailing wage. Given the lack of knowledge regarding workers’ abilities and
attitudes, both demand for the services of such workers and, consequently, the
wage offered are likely to be low. A new worker who believes that she or he is
more productive than the wage she or he is offered indicates can “guarantee” her
or his output by offering to operate as a fixed-rent tenant. The worker then bears
the onus of the information problem (Barzel, 1989: p. 40).
Players on co-ops were likewise guaranteeing their ability by taking on the role of
residual claimant and thereby bearing the burden of failure.12 Lazear (1986) similarly

7

showed that when workers have superior knowledge of their productivities, higher ability
workers will self-select piece-rate contracts over fixed wage contracts.13
The preceding examples show the advantage of profit sharing over fixed wages in
attracting higher ability players (screening), but they ignore the team production problem.
Because co-op players shared the returns, those of inferior ability could have attempted to
free-ride on the high ability players. In response to this, we have suggested that members
of a co-op would have engaged in mutual monitoring or screening to limit (if not
eliminate) this practice. We model this in a manner similar to Kandel and Lazear’s
(1992) analysis of peer monitoring in profit-sharing partnerships.14
Specifically, let R(A,K,θ) be the revenue earned by the team as a function of the
average ability of the players, A, a capital input, K, and a random variable θ. To capture
peer monitoring, we write the average ability as A=A(e1,…,en), where ej is the level of
effort that player j devotes to screening (measured in dollars), and Aj ≡ ∂A / ∂e j > 0 for all

j. Given equal sharing of net revenue, the problem for each player on the co-op is to
max
ej

R( A(e j , e− j ), K ,θ ) − rK
n

− ej ,

j=1,…,n,

(1)

where r is the cost of capital. The resulting first-order condition is

1
(RA Aj ) − 1 = 0 ,
n

j=1,…,n.

(2)

For simplicity, we assume that the optimal effort for all players is the same and equal to
e* (that is, the marginal productivity of effort, Aj is the same for all players). The Nash
equilibrium thus yields a return for each player equal to
R( A( e* ), K , θ ) − rK
− e* .
n

(3)
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The desirability of a co-op can now be seen to depend on the efficacy of mutual
monitoring in preventing free riding by below-average players. And since (2) implies
that incentives for individual team members to engage in such monitoring were fairly
weak for moderate-sized teams (n≈10), we expect that co-op clubs would have had
inferior talent compared to the fully informed stock clubs (assuming that the latter had
employed only high ability players). This is consistent both with their poorer
performance on the field and their shakier financial status.
Despite the above disadvantages of co-op clubs both on and off the field, they
nevertheless served a useful purpose by allowing untried players an opportunity to
display their abilities. In this sense, one might think of them as nascent “minor league”
teams in the days before teams created their own specialized farm systems. Although
good players would have coveted salaried positions on the stock clubs, their best option
was to play on a co-op club where they could prove their ability and eventually earn a
birth in the “majors.” (The situation is analogous to a salesman who initially agrees to
work entirely on commission, thereby bearing all of the risk of failure, but eventually
hopes to be promoted to a salaried position.) At the same time, players discovered to
have low ability (free riders) would have been cut from the team. If this logic is correct,
the model implies that once the ability of co-op players was revealed, “good” players
would have succeeded in jumping to stock clubs, while “bad” players would have
remained with co-ops or been cut. We offer some evidence on this prediction in the next
section.
Before turning to the empirical evidence, we speculate on the demise of co-ops in
professional baseball (none survived to join the new National League in 1876). To do so,
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we compare the above analysis of mutual screening in co-ops under imperfect
information to specialized screening in fixed wage clubs along the lines of AlchianDemsetz (also see Lueck, 1994). To examine this case, we write A(E) as the average
ability of players on a wage club, where E is the level of screening by the specialized
monitor and AE>0. If the monitor is also the residual claimant, he will choose E to solve

max R( A( E )), K , θ ) − wn − rK − E ,

(4)

E

where w is the fixed wage paid to players who make the team. The first-order condition
for optimal monitoring is
R A AE − 1 = 0 ,

(5)

and the resulting maximized return to the owner/monitor is
R ( A( E * ), K , θ ) − wn − rK − E * .

(6)

Now suppose that the owner offers players who make the team a wage equal to
their return from an optimally managed co-op as given by (3). This will attract players
(especially if they are risk averse) and will yield the owner profits if
R ( A( E * ), K , θ ) − E * > R( A( e* ), K , θ ) − ne* .

(7)

This condition turns on the relative effectiveness and cost of mutual versus specialized
screening/monitoring. We have suggested that in early baseball, mutual monitoring was
probably at least as effective as specialized monitoring (despite the incentive problem
noted above) because players were the specialists. This favored co-ops. However, as
baseball matured, a class of non-playing specialists emerged, primarily from the ranks of
former players. Also, as the sport became more profitable, teams devoted more resources
to scouting and coaching. These factors likely combined to alter the technology of
monitoring in favor of specialization. And once the screening advantage of co-ops was
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eliminated, the superior risk-bearing ability of owners compared to players presumably
reinforced the desirability of fixed wage contracts. For these reasons, it is not surprising
that cooperative clubs, although they briefly served a useful purpose, were short-lived in
professional baseball.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section we explore the implications of our theoretical arguments using data
on the characteristics of all players who played on one of the National Association’s
eleven teams in 1872. The data roughly verify our conjecture that the co-op clubs of the
National Association (NA) functioned as a nascent minor league, where players of
unknown quality exhibited their skills, and then had a tendency to graduate to a stock
club once their abilities had been demonstrated.
Although the NA formed in 1871, we use 1872 as our base year because it is the
year for which the split between wage and co-op teams was most even.15 As shown in
Table 1, the six stock (wage) teams (Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, Troy,
and Cleveland) finished the 1872 season with a combined record of 158-86 (.648),16
while the five co-ops (Brooklyn Atlantics, Washington Olympics, Middletown, Brooklyn
Eckfords, and Washington Nationals) compiled a combined record of 18-90 (.167).
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of NA players by team and by team type
(stock or co-op) for the 1872 season. The table includes each team’s mean batting
average, which is our primary measure of player quality,17 but it also includes several
measures of player experience. The first such measure is the percentage of players on
each team with prior NA experience (meaning that they played on an NA team in 1871).
The second measure is the average number of years of prior experience in top semi-
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professional clubs prior to the formation of the NA. Ryczek (1998) provides a list of
such teams for the years 1865-1870; any player who was a member of one of these clubs
was considered to have had top-flight base ball experience. Finally, Table 2 also includes
the number of years that an average player on each team stayed in professional base ball
after 1872, which may be cautiously interpreted as an additional proxy of player quality.
Included here are years spent on NA teams from 1873-1875, as well as years spent on
teams in the National League (which formed in 1876), the American Association (which
existed from 1882-1891), the Union Association (1884) and the Players’ League
(1890).18
The data reveal marked differences between stock and co-op players. It is
apparent that stock teams simply had significantly better players. Players on stock teams
had a batting average a full 50 points higher than players on co-op teams in 1872. In
addition, stock players had longer careers after 1872, playing almost 2 years longer on
average than their counterparts on co-op teams. Moreover, 90% of stock players had
prior experience in the NA and other semi- professional leagues. By contrast, only 27%
of co-op players had prior experience in the NA, and the mean number of years
experience in other (non-professional) leagues for a co-op player was 1.3, as compared to
3 years for stock players. Thus, not only were stock players better in 1872, they had been
around base ball a longer period of time and were on average older, making it more likely
that others had knowledge of their skills.
Table 3 presents the results of fitting two simple logit models to the above data,
where the dependent variable is equal to one if a player was on a stock team, and zero if
the player was on a co-op. The second model drops age from the equation; because age
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is unknown for some players, inclusion of age in the model reduces degrees of freedom,
and in any case, age is moderately correlated with experience. Both models fit the data
well and reveal that the two most important joint predictors of what type of team a player
was on in 1872 are batting average (quality) and prior experience in the NA--specifically,
better players and those with more experience disproportionately populated stock teams
in 1872. These results support our claim that stock teams were formed first with players
known to be of high ability.
We next ask what became of the players after the 1872 season. In particular, did
the better co-op players tend to move to stock clubs? Of the 90 players in the league in
1872, 54 played on stock teams in 1873, 12 remained on co-ops in 1873, 23 dropped out
of the league, and 1 died. Table 4 shows the results of fitting simple ordered logit models
using this information.19 For all the models in Table 4, the dependent variable is the
player’s employment status in 1873. Specifically, the dependent variable equals 2 if the
player played for a stock team in 1873, 1 if the player played for a co-op team in 1873,
and zero if the player dropped out of the league (the one player who died is excluded
from these models).
As explanatory variables for the player’s employment status in 1873, we use the
same variables as before (batting average, age, prior NA experience, and experience in
other leagues), but we include two additional explanatory variables. We first include the
type of team (stock or co-op) the player played on in 1872 as a control variable.
Intuitively, it is likely that a player with experience on a stock club has known attributes.
We also include a dummy variable equal to one if the player played an infield position or
was a catcher in 1872, and zero otherwise.20 Our reasoning in including the latter
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variable was to control for the possibility that some players were more skilled defensive
players than others, and players who came to be known as skilled defensive players
would also be more likely to move to stock clubs, or at least stay in the league on a co-op
team. (In early base ball, players often played a variety of positions, and those who
played a majority of the time at catcher or in the infield were likely to be a team’s better
defensive players.)
While parameters of an ordered logit are generally difficult to interpret directly,
the fitted models displayed in Table 4 show that players with higher averages and
infielders were more likely to be placed higher in the ordering. Previous NA experience
and other experience were not statistically significant, but this is not surprising given that
by 1873, all players in the league had by definition one year of experience in the National
Association. Some of the variables are collinear and a clearer and simpler picture of
player transition emerges in the stripped down model III. To aid in interpretation of the
model, Table 5 uses model III to form predicted probabilities of observing different types
of player movement between the years 1872 and 1873 based on simple characteristics of
some hypothetical players.21
Table 5 reveals, first, that players who were on stock teams were fairly likely to
remain on stock teams in 1873. S1, for example, is a hypothetical player who played on a
stock team in 1872, played in the infield, and batted the league average (.271). The
likelihood that a player like S1 would remain on a stock team in 1873 was approximately
88%. Player C1 is identical to S1 except for the fact that he played on a co-op in 1872.
While C1 was more likely to move to a stock team than either of the other possibilities,
his likelihood of moving to a stock team was only 48%. However, C3, who might be
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considered one of the better players in the league, batting .331 and playing in the infield,
stood a 60% chance of moving up to a stock team in 1873. By contrast, C6, a marginal
player at best who was on a co-op team in 1872, stood a very high (67%) chance of
dropping out of the NA.
While players who were on stock teams in 1872 were likely to remain on stock
teams in 1873 (even the worst hypothetical player, S6, had a 62% chance of remaining
with a stock team), the best players on co-ops were likely to move to stock teams. Table
5 also reveals that it was generally unlikely that players would remain with co-ops for
both 1872 and 1873, or move from stock teams to co-ops between the two years. Indeed,
1872 co-op players were more likely to drop out of the league than to remain on co-ops,
particularly average to poor co-op players. These results generally support our theoretical
predictions about player movements and our interpretation of co-ops as an early minor
league system.
CONCLUSION
Economists have devoted considerable attention to the study of different types of
organizations. This paper has contributed to that literature by studying the organization
of early professional base ball clubs. The specific question we addressed was why some
of these clubs paid players fixed wages while other were organized as player
cooperatives. Our theoretical analysis suggested that player cooperatives were a response
to a potential adverse selection problem in the market for players, once the players of
known ability were signed to fixed wage contracts. We argued, however, that
cooperatives would only have been partially successful in screening out low quality
players because of the team production problem. This explains the observation that
cooperative clubs were inferior to wage clubs. Co-ops nevertheless served a useful
15

function in early base ball by giving untested players an opportunity to prove their ability.
As a result, we suggested that they could be viewed as an early form of minor league.
Our empirical analysis using data on player performance and experience generally
supported this view of cooperative clubs. In particular, we found, first, that members of
stock clubs tended to be those of higher ability and more experience, and second, that the
best co-op players tended to move to stock clubs while little movement in the other
direction occurred.
Just as play on the field has evolved, the organizational structure of professional
baseball has evolved too. Improvements in scouting and player evaluation eventually
eliminated the primary benefit of cooperative teams. Thus, they were destined to go the
way of the underhand pitching delivery and become part of baseball’s history.
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Table 1:Performance of Stock versus Co-op Teams, 1872 Season

Team
Type
Boston Red Stocking
wage
Philadelphia Athletics
wage
Lord Baltimores
wage
New York Mutuals
wage
Troy Haymakers
wage
Cleveland Forest Citys
wage
Brooklyn Atlantics
co-op
Washington Olympics
co-op
Middletown Mansfields
co-op
Brooklyn Eckfords
co-op
Washington Nationals
co-op
Source: Ryczek (1999: p. 93)

1872 Record
39-8
30-14
34-19
34-20
15-10
6-15
8-27
2-7
5-19
3-26
0-11
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Pct.
.830
.682
.642
.630
.600
.286
.229
.222
.208
.103
.000

Table 2: Stock and Co-op Team Averages
Batting Average
(position players
only)

Age*

% National
Association
Experience

Mean prior years
experience, other
leagues

Mean Years
played after 1872

Athletics (N=8)
Baltimore (N=9)
Cleveland (N=8)
Mutuals (N=8)
Red Stockings (N=8)
Troy (N=8)

.308
.281
.293
.276
.307
.294

25.3
24.7
24.8
25.9
25.6
25.5

100%
100%
88%
75%
88%
88%

2.6
3.2
2.4
3.5
3.0
3.3

8.3
5.9
6.5
5.8
5.4
2.9

Stock Teams (N=49)

.293

25.3

90%

3.0

5.8

Atlantics (N=8)
Eckfords (N=8)
Mansfields (N=9)
Nationals (N=8)
Olympics (N=8)

.241
.206
.278
.254
.233

23.3
23.9
20.3
22.0
23.6

13%
25%
0%
25%
75%

1.4
2.3
0.0
1.0
2.1

5.9
4.0
4.9
3.6
1.6

Co-op Teams (N=41)

.243

22.5

27%

1.3

4.0

*

10 age observations missing.
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Table 3: Logit models: Dependent variable = 1 if player on a stock team, 1872
Independent variables

I

II

Constant

-12.84*
(-2.83)

-7.55*
(3.89)

National Association Experience?

2.58*
(3.26)

2.91*
(4.04)

Average

24.68*
(3.02)

20.06*
(3.08)

Prior years experience, other leagues

0.013
(0.05)

0.29
(1.52)

Age

0.21
(1.4)

-

Χ2
N

49.19
80

56.46
90

t-statistics in parenthesis under estimated coefficients
*
denotes significance at the 99% level
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Table 4: Ordered logit models: Dependent variable = team type, 1873
Independent variables

I

II

III

National Association Experience?

0.51
(0.71)

0.64
(0.96)

-

Average

8.56***
(1.60)

8.72***
(1.85)

8.22***
(1.78)

Years experience, other leagues

-0.16
(-0.80)

-0.15
(-0.91)

-

Age

.03
(0.28)

-

-

Played for stock team, 1872?

1.65**
(2.18)

1.96*
(2.78)

2.05*
(3.62)

Infielder or catcher in 1872?

.83
(1.46)

0.92***
(1.7)

1.01***
(1.90)

Cutoff 1
Cutoff 2

2.96
3.63

2.57
3.38

2.51
3.31

Χ2
N

25.3
79

34.57
89

34.89
89

Ancillary Parameters:

z-statistics in parenthesis under estimated coefficients
*
denotes significance at the 99% level
**
denotes significance at the 95% level
***
denotes significance at the 90% level
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Table 5: Predicted Probabilities associated with Model III (Table 3)
Batting
Average in
1872

Infielder or
catcher in
1872?

Played for
Stock team,
1872?

Predicted
Prob. out of
NA 1873

Predicted
Prob. on a
Co-op team
1873

Predicted
Prob. on a
Stock team
1873

0.271

0.61

0.55

0.19

0.15

0.66

Hypothetical
1872 Co-op
Players:
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

0.271
0.271
0.331
0.331
0.221
0.221

1
0
1
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0.33
0.57
0.23
0.45
0.42
0.67

0.19
0.18
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.15

0.48
0.25
0.60
0.36
0.38
0.18

Hypothetical
1872 Stock
Players:
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6

0.271
0.271
0.331
0.331
0.221
0.221

1
0
1
0
1
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

0.06
0.15
0.04
0.09
0.08
0.20

0.06
0.13
0.04
0.09
0.08
0.16

0.88
0.72
0.92
0.81
0.83
0.64

Average
Player:
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NOTES
1

The title does not contain a typo: base ball in the nineteenth century was written as two words.
Prior to the Red Stockings, several of the top players on amateur teams were paid in one form or another.
3
See Ryczek (1999) for a comprehensive history of the National Association.
4
See, e.g., Scully (1989), Sommers (1992), and Zimbalist (1992).
5
Stiglitz (1974) examines the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives under share contracts.
6
See Barzel (1989: pp. 30-31) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972: pp. 784-785), who also eschew risksharing explanations for different organizational forms. We do suggest below, however, that the demise of
cooperative teams in professional baseball was due in part to the superior risk-bearing ability of owners
compared to players.
7
Burk (1994, p. 45) notes that player statistics were developed at this time, in part, to allow “costconscious bosses … a means of relating performance to pay,” but the problem, then as now, was how to
“adjust these team-dependent numbers for the shortcomings of the rest of the lineup.”
8
By the 1870’s, players tended to specialize in positions as in modern baseball, but most had experience at
other positions.
9
Modern baseball, however, has clearly moved in the direction of a single specialized monitor who is
subject to dismissal by the owner (the residual claimant). Thus it looks more like the Alchian-Demsetz
model. See the discussion below.
10
See Ryczek (1998) for a history of organized baseball from the Civil War up to the era of
professionalism.
11
Apparently, even players at the low end of the wage scale generally earned more than they could have
outside of baseball. See Goldstein (1989: p. 114), Burk (1994, p. 42), and Ryczek (1999: p. 35).
12
At this point, one might ask why players known to have high ability were willing to join stock teams for
a fixed wage rather than forming co-ops of their own. Although the expected returns under the two
organizations would have been identical, players would have borne all the risk in a co-op. Thus, even
slightly risk averse players would have preferred the fixed wage arrangement.
13
Also see Lazear (2000), where he discusses output-based pay as a sorting mechanism.
14
One difference is that they focus on mutual monitoring to prevent shirking rather than to screen out
inferior workers.
15
All of the co-op teams in 1872 were new to the league in that year, and all folded prior to the start of the
next season. Only two co-ops had been in the league in 1871, but both dropped out before the the 1872
season, while the Washington Olympics, a wage team in 1871, played as a co-op in 1872 (Thorn, Palmer,
and Gershman, 2001).
16
Cleveland (6-15) appears to be an outlier among the wage teams for reasons that are unclear.
17
We have excluded pitching statistics from the analysis because of the small number of pitchers. There
are nine observations for Baltimore and the Mutuals because these two teams had an additional position
player who played a significant amount of time.
18
We do not distinguish among these leagues as all are classified by baseball historians as “major leagues.”
19
See Greene (1997). Some details are discussed in footnote 21.
20
It was, of course, impossible to do this in the previous logit models, as in 1872 each team had the same
number of infielders and catchers.
21
Predicted probabilities are formed as follows when there are three ordered outcomes. If
yj=β1x1j+β2x2j+β3x3j, where the βjs are estimated parameters, and κ1 and κ2 denote the estimated ancillary
parameters (cutoff points), then the (predicted) probability that the dependent variable is equal to zero is
1/(1+eyj-κ1), the probability that the dependent variable is equal to one is 1/(1+eyj-κ2)-1/(1+eyj-κ1), and the
probability that the dependent variable is equal to two is 1/(1+eyj-κ2).
2
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